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The emergence of integrated private reporting 
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Structured Abstract 
 
Purpose: Private social and environmental reporting (SER) has grown considerably 
in recent years, consistent with a rise in institutional investor engagement and 
dialogue with investee companies. We interpret the emergence of integrated private 
reporting through the lens of institutional logics. We frame the emergence of 
integrated private reporting as a merging of two hitherto separate and possibly rival 
institutional logics. 
Methodology/Approach: We interviewed 19 companies listed on the FTSE100 and 
20 UK institutional investors. The interviews were semi-structured and analysed in an 
interpretive fashion. 
Findings and Implications: We provide evidence to suggest that private SER is 
beginning to merge with private financial reporting and that, as a result integrated 
private reporting is emerging. This trend is mirroring the international trend in public 
reporting toward an integrated approach. Specifically, we find that specialist social 
responsible investment managers are starting to attend private financial reporting 
meetings whilst mainstream fund managers are starting to attend private meetings on 
environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues. Further, senior company 
directors are becoming increasingly conversant with ESG issues. We interpret our 
findings as two possible scenarios: (i) there is a genuine hybridisation occurring in 
UK institutional investment such that integrated private reporting is emerging, or; (ii) 
the financial logic is absorbing and effectively neutralising the responsible investment 
logic. 
Originality: This is the first research investigating the evolution of private integrated 
reporting. 
 
Keywords: institutional investment; integrated private reporting; private social and 
environmental reporting (SER); private financial reporting; institutional logics; 
paradigm shift. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Prior literature and observation of policy/practice suggest substantial change in UK 
institutional investment in recent years. Private communication channels have evolved 
in the form of private financial reporting,
1
 spurred on by the UK agenda for corporate 
governance reform initiated by the Cadbury Report (1992).  These meetings have 
tended to focus entirely on financial issues and have represented a way for 
shareholders to encourage companies to embody beliefs and behaviours consistent 
with shareholder value (Roberts, Sanderson, Barker and Hendry, 2006). Thus, the 
process of engagement and dialogue between investors and investees has been 
preoccupied by financial issues. A strand of academic literature bears witness to the 
emergence of a parallel, potentially rival, form of institutional investor engagement, 
namely ‘responsible investment’. Earlier forms of responsible investment referred to 
as ‘ethical investment’, socially responsible investment, et al., represented a marginal 
area of dedicated fund management where portfolios were positively and/or 
negatively screened according to ethical principles.
2
 These forms have evolved into a 
‘best in sector’ investment strategy where no industry is excluded but investors 
concentrate on the ‘best’ performers within industries according to environmental, 
social and governance (ESG) criteria. This relatively new strategic departure 
epitomises what is now termed ‘responsible investment’ and has allowed 
consideration of ESG issues to be applied across mainstream investment portfolios.
3
  
 
One mechanism of responsible investment is private social and environmental 
reporting (SER), involving one-on-one meetings between companies and their core 
institutional investors (usually meetings between the corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) and socially responsible investment (SRI) managers) on ESG issues.
4
 
Academic studies suggest that these meetings run in tandem, taking place entirely 
separately, from one-on-ones on financial issues, i.e. private financial reporting.
5
 A 
recent study adopting a sociological perspective showed that private SER is 
characterised by significant elements of impression management and that the ‘myth’ 
created within the meetings of a responsible investor and a responsible company, by 
both parties, was more concerned with presenting a front than with genuine 
                                                 
1
 Private financial reporting is the term used to refer to one-on-one meetings between institutional 
investors and their investee companies which focus on financial concerns. 
2
 Screening has been defined as, "Avoiding investments in companies that do not reflect an investor's 
values ... The screening process is the inclusion or exclusion of corporate securities in investment 
portfolios, supporting companies with strong records in certain screens and avoiding investments in 
firms that fall short in these areas" (Henningsen 2002, p.163). 
3
 This shift in focus and the growth of responsible investment has been noted in the academic and 
practitioner literature, for example, Ambachtsheer (2005), Friedman and Miles (2002), Mansley 
(2000), McCann, Solomon and Solomon (2003), Solomon (2002), Solomon, Solomon and Norton 
(2002) and Sparkes (2002). 
4
 There are a host of other mechanisms within the responsible investment process which involve 
engagement and dialogue on social and environmental issues including investor roadshows, voting and 
web-based disclosures/blogs and other forms of dialogue with investors and other stakeholders. 
However there is a growing body of academic literature devoted to the face to face verbal 
communication between companies and their institutional investors on social and environmental issues 
and this paper focuses exclusively on the process of private SER. 
5
 See Solomon and Solomon (2006) and Solomon, Solomon, Norton and Joseph (2011) for empirical 
evidence on these separate private SER meetings, their content and role in responsible investment. 
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accountability (Solomon et al., forthcoming).
6
 In other words, the paper suggested 
that private SER, although quite well-developed, appears to have little impact on 
investment decision making.  
 
In the public reporting sphere, until relatively recently, sustainability reporting has 
also remained generally separate from published financial reporting, mirroring the 
similar separation in private reporting. However, in the last three years there has been 
a substantial shift, with the emergence of integrated reporting internationally. The 
latest triannual survey of corporate responsibility reporting by KPMG (2011) 
recognized the beginnings of a shift internationally from separate corporate 
responsibility and sustainability reporting. An integrated report integrates material 
social and environmental information into the core reporting vehicle, a company’s 
annual report (King Report, 2009; International Integrated Reporting Committee, 
IIRC, 2011; Solomon and Maroun, 2012). “An integrated report is not simply an 
amalgamation of the financial statements and the sustainability report. It incorporates, 
in clear language, material information from these and other sources to enable 
stakeholders to evaluate the organisation’s performance and to make an informed 
assessment about its ability to create and sustain value…. By its very nature an 
integrated report cannot simply be a reporting by-product. It needs to flow from the 
heart of the organisation and it should be the organisation’s primary report to 
stakeholders” (Mervyn King’s Foreword, Integrated Reporting Committee of South 
Africa, IRCSA, 2011, p.1, emphasis added). South Africa, through the publication of 
the third King Report on Corporate Governance (2009) was the first country to adopt 
integrated reporting as a listing requirement for the country’s stock exchange, the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) (IRCSA, 2011, Solomon and Maroun, 2012). 
The IIRC has for some time been working towards recommending and requiring 
companies worldwide to produce integrated reports (IIRC, 2011; IIRC, 2013). IIRC 
(2013) explains that integrated reporting emphasises the importance of integrated 
thinking within an organisation, defining integrated thinking as, “… the active 
consideration by an organisation of the relationships between its various operating 
and functional units and the capitals that the organisation uses of affects. Integrated 
thinking leads to integrated decision-making and actions that consider the creation of 
value of the short, medium and long term” (IIRC, 2013, p.3). 
 
The findings of a recent study (Solomon and Maroun, 2012) painted a complex 
picture of the impact of the introduction of integrated reporting on the reporting of 
social, environmental and ethical (SEE) information in South African companies’ 
annual reports. There was an undeniable increase in the quantity of SEE information 
reported as a result of King III’s requirement. The study found SEE information 
appears throughout a significantly greater number of sections of the reports for 
2010/2011 compared to 2009, before the introduction of IR. However, a striking 
weakness of the integration of SEE information was significant repetition throughout 
the reports. The authors suggested that perhaps the reporters were unclear about what 
an integrated report ‘should’ look like and what it ‘should’ include.  
 
 
                                                 
6
 This paper adopts a framework deriving from the work of Erving Goffman on impression 
management and theatrical behaviour in face-to-face interaction. 
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The views of South African institutional investors towards the usefulness of the new 
integrated reports have been canvassed recently (Atkins and Maroun, 2014). From 
interviews with 20 members of the South African institutional investment community, 
the study derived a series of key findings for policy makers which inform the IR 
agenda, summarised as follows: 
(i) The South African institutional investment community welcomes the introduction 
of IR and, despite identifying concerns and obstacles, they look forward to its 
development and progress, viewing IR as an improvement in disclosures for 
investment decision-making. 
(ii) The introduction of mandatory IR in South Africa is seen as enhancing 
significantly South Africa’s reputation in global financial markets and 
competitiveness. 
(iii) South African institutional investors identified several areas where they felt IR 
should be improved: reports should be shorter and less complex, they need to be 
decluttered; repetition should be avoided; a box-ticking, compliance approach should 
be avoided. 
(iv) Several obstacles to the development of IR were identified including: the need to 
avoid capture of the agenda by auditors and reporting consultants; the need to avoid 
impression management by corporate preparers; the need to address lack of financial 
literacy among trustees of pension funds. 
(v) Important recommendations for improving IR were identified including: the need 
for companies to engage more with their institutional investors on the content of their 
integrated reports; there should be a drive to raise the awareness of South African 
asset owners and pension fund trustees towards materiality of ESG issues to their 
investment portfolios’ performance; the need for companies to engage more 
effectively with their non-financial stakeholders; the need for corporate boards of 
directors to be more involved in the process of producing integrated reports; the need 
for an explicit IR framework to be developed to assist preparers; IR should be focused 
more on broader stakeholder accountability rather than just aimed at shareholders 
reflecting a more holistic approach to reporting; companies should facilitate 
continuing financial education for their employees. 
 
This paper seeks to assess the extent to which an integrated approach to reporting is 
emerging in the private reporting sphere. We interpret the possible emergence of 
integrated private reporting through the lens of neoinstitutional theory, especially the 
concept of institutional logics. The dominance of the long-standing finance paradigm 
of shareholder value and agency theory, which typically excludes ‘non-financial’ 
factors may be diminishing. This paper explores whether there are changes within the 
private SER process, according to the views of the corporate community, which may 
be symptomatic of a shift in the dominant paradigm underlying financial markets. 
Private SER, traditionally marginalised within institutional investment may be 
embedding itself within a short space of time within the heart of mainstream 
investment activity but there is currently little empirical evidence of such a shift. As 
private SER and private financial reporting are increasingly frequent and becoming 
significant areas of corporate accounting and accountability, this paper responds to a 
call for further research into the coexistence of competing, plural logics especially 
within the accounting field, “… a focus on institutional rationality in the form of 
multiple, competing logics can be particularly fruitful. While there has been some 
good work in this direction, much more needs to be done to understand where logics 
and new practices come from and how they relate to each other. Accounting provides 
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a crucial context to explore these issues and since institutional and practice theories 
are prevalent perspectives within the community of behavioral accounting 
researchers, accounting scholars are in a prime position to contribute valuable 
knowledge to our understanding of the dynamics of institutions and practice” 
(Lounsbury, 2008, p.358). 
 
Although several studies have investigated the views of institutional investors towards 
private SER and its evolution, there has been hardly any attempt to canvas the views 
of the corporate community regarding the usefulness, function, content and evolution 
of private SER. Solomon and Darby’s (2005) study involved interviews with CSR 
managers from FTSE100 companies but in general studies have focused on 
institutional investors’ views. Institutional investors represent a distinct professional 
institutional grouping and are therefore an apt focus for investigation into institutional 
logics but similarly corporates are involved in private SER and represent significant 
institutions requiring study. Institutions have been defined as supraorganisational 
patterns of activity by which individuals and organisations produce and reproduce 
their material subsistence and organise time and space, as well as being symbolic 
systems, ways of ordering reality, which render time and space meaningful (Friedland 
and Alford, 1991). Institutions are also thought to be guided by a distinct institutional 
logic. In this paper we provide evidence pertaining to the evolution of private SER (as 
a core responsible investment mechanism) to indicate whether the dominant finance 
logic in institutional investment may be metamorphosing into a broader, holistic logic 
of investment strategy and decision-making. This paper aims to: 
- Interpret the recent evolution of institutional investment and the development 
of responsible investment through the lens of institutional logics; 
- Research the perceptions of representatives from FTSE100 companies and 
institutional investors, involved directly in private SER regarding its 
evolution; 
- Explore the extent to which an integrated approach is emerging in private 
reporting 
- Refer to neoinstitutional theory and institutional logics to interpret this 
potential integration. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section two we discuss 
existing literature relating to private SER as well as an overview of the practitioner 
environment and a discussion of relevant theoretical work. In this section we seek to 
interpret the evolution of responsible investment through the lens of institutional 
logics. Section three outlines our research method. In section four we present our 
research findings from interviews with 19 FTSE100 companies and 20 institutional 
investors and the paper concludes with a discussion in section five. 
 
2. Prior literature and theoretical framework 
 
Competing institutional logics  
There is a long history of investigation into the way in which institutions, 
organisations and society change and shift over time. Institutional theory investigates 
structural change and shifts in the status quo. A perennial issue addressed by 
institutional research is the difficulty of overthrowing the status quo, “… actors may 
overthrow institutional structures (such as organizational forms), rejecting the status 
quo of how to do things, but underlying patterns of privilege may remain untouched, 
or even be strengthened—reinforcing the status quo of who benefits” (Greenwood and 
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Suddaby, 2006, p.43). Indeed, neoinstitutional theory and institutional logics focus on 
how, and if, institutional status quo may be transformed. As it has evolved, 
neoinstitutional theory has shifted from focusing on isomorphism and mimetic change 
processes to a more multidimensional approach where competing logics and 
heterogeneity are accepted within organisational models (Lounsbury, 2008; Scott, 
2008). This ‘new’ approach is traced back to Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) where 
perceptions of earlier ‘two-stage model’ of diffusion and associated notions such as 
‘institutionalization’ and ‘isomorphism’ being replaced by ntions of institutional 
environments being more fragmented and contested, influenced by multiple, 
competing logics” (Lounsbury, 2007). Logics can be competing and diverse, with 
institutional environments being understood as pluralistic (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). 
Indeed, the concept of institutional logics has evolved which encompasses competing 
forms of practice (Lounsbury, 2008, p.353). Logics at the societal level may be the 
capitalist market, or the nuclear family (Lounsbury, 2008). At the level of industries, 
logics focus on decision-makers and on a series of issues and solutions (Lounsbury, 
2008). Further, institutional logics have been interpreted as cultural beliefs that shape 
the cognitions and behaviours of actors” (Dunn and Jones, 2010). 
 
Contending logics can fundamentally shape variation in practices and behaviour 
within an industry. For instance, Lounsbury (2007) examined the spread of 
contracting to independent professional money management firms among US mutual 
funds. Mutual fund firms were run according to the logic of trusteeship whereby their 
main goal was to focus on conservative, long-term investment. Consequently in the 
mid-20
th 
century mutual funds consisted chiefly of conservatively managed 
diversified common stock funds. However, the growing dominance of portfolio theory 
and financial economics ushered in professional money management service firms, 
leading to the emergence of a performance logic. This new performance logic was 
characterised by more aggressive investing techniques in order to maximise short-
term returns. Despite the increasing dominance of the performance logic, the trustee 
logic survived to some extent in the mutual fund industry. The new performance logic 
was well-established by the 1960s but the competing trustee logic continued to thrive 
in the 1970s as more passively managed index and other funds emerged. 
 
One of the important issues raised in the literature, relating to competing and 
coexisting institutional logics is whether the values and mores underlying the different 
logics are compatible or contradictory. For example, as pointed out by Laughlin et al. 
(1994), it would be difficult to find two organisational approaches more different 
from a values perspective than medical care and financial considerations. It is this 
clash of values which makes hybridisation extremely difficult. The people pioneering 
each of two competing logics may be espoused to entirely different value systems 
rendering ant genuine collaboration and eventual merging difficult if not impossible. 
In financial investment the likelihood that the underlying values of financial, 
mainstream fund managers and those of SRI managers are potentially miles apart. In 
terms of the people involved, many of those involved in the SRI ‘movement’ come 
from a social/environmental activist background. Conversely, mainstream fund 
managers tend to come from financial investment training.
7
 Dunn and Jones look at 
                                                 
7
 It is interesting that until recently SRI and the consideration of ESG factors have been generally 
absent from UK academic and professional training programmes. Only relatively recently have ethics, 
governance and stakeholder accountability begun to be incorporated into professional accounting and 
financial management qualifications such as ACCA, for example. 
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the significant role of academic education in developing the competing logics in 
healthcare. Similarly, the role of professional and academic education in 
finance/investment/accounting in helping or hindering the advance of SRI cannot be 
overstated.  
 
Institutional theory has been used extensively within the accounting literature to 
analyse and interpret changes in organisational structure and policy and the 
institutional (Lounsbury, 2008). In accounting, institutional theory has been used to 
interpret resistance to change within organisations as well as organisational change 
more broadly (Laughlin, 1991; Laughlin et al., 1994; Broadbent et al., 2001). The 
neoinstitutional framework can be especially useful in analysing institutional 
developments when change happens suddenly or where there is significant resistance 
to change from existing institutional bodies or structures. Where there are evolutions 
in thinking and evidence of shifts in social reality, aspects of neoinstitutional theory 
can serve to elucidate these changes and enhance understanding. Fiss (2008) 
expounded on the evolution of institutional theory and emphasised the role of 
resistance to institutional change.  
 
The concept of institutional logics is frequently applied to the analysis of institutional 
change and a logic is viewed as the, “socially constructed, historical pattern of 
material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals 
produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and 
provide meaning to their social reality’’ (Thornton, 2004, p.69). Often, using 
longitudinal analysis, the evolution of an institutional field is interpreted as the shift 
from a historically dominant logic to a different, contemporary logic. Historically 
oriented studies are common (Sine and David, 2003; Blatter, 2003; Castells, 2000; 
Zijderveld, 2000; Meyer and Hammerschmid, 2006; Green et al., 2008).  
 
Competing logics were shown to co-exist and rivalry between competing logics was 
found to be managed through the development of collaborative relationships (Reay 
and Hinings, 2009). Dunn and Jones (2010) showed that multiple, plural logics can 
coexist, fluctuating over time and creating dynamic tensions. Indeed, they emphasised 
that institutional change did not necessarily involve the replacement of a dominant 
logic by another but where professions operate in multiple institutional spheres, plural 
logics can thrive together. Specifically, they identified two logics central to medical 
education as the care logic and the science logic which they found to have coexisted 
over a long period of time. An alternative is the hybridisation of logics where one 
aspect of a logic is effectively absorbed into a dominant logic as tensions within a 
profession cannot be sustained over time (Dunn and Jones, 2010; Suddaby and 
Greenwood, 2005). We now turn to analysing our research questions from the 
perspective of institutional logics. 
 
Emergence of a ‘responsible investment logic’ 
 
Our research shows that the institutional logic of finance, whereby only core financial 
indicators are considered, has for some time coexisted with a responsible investment 
logic such that private SER is running in tandem with private financial reporting. 
Further we seek to discover the extent to which, if at all, private reporting may be 
adopting an integrated approach, mirroring shifts towards integrated reporting in the 
public reporting sphere. 
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As a normative basis for our enquiry, we posit that the ongoing crisis of climate 
change and its severe repercussions not merely on the natural environment but on 
societies and businesses worldwide are unlikely to leave the financial markets 
untouched. Orthodox models which ignore ‘non-financial’ matters such as ‘the 
environment’, we suggest, may be no longer suitable to economies which are 
increasingly affected by the symptoms of changing climatic conditions (storms, 
unpredictable weather patterns, crop shortages, droughts/floods, rising sea levels, 
governmental pollution/carbon taxes, to name but a few). Financial models relied on 
for decades by the institutional investment community may no longer suffice in the 
new century where social and environmental issues are paramount. Similarly, the 
financial crisis arising from the banking sector demonstrated a failure of the corporate 
governance system, despite the apparent strength of corporate governance codes of 
practice and policy documentation. The governance model enshrined in agency theory 
and shareholder accountability failed to prevent failures in risk management, 
boardroom ethics and remuneration structures. Shifts in terminology have occurred 
continuously since the turn of the century in the domain of responsible investment 
with new terms evolving and superseding each other at a rapid pace.
8
 Investigating the 
recent evolution of private SER and responsible investment more broadly is crucial to 
furthering an understanding of the evolution of the financial markets more broadly 
and to gaining insights into whether the status quo of theoretical finance is steadfast 
or whether there is a merging of institutional logics. 
 
 
Recent years have witnessed substantial change within the UK institutional 
investment industry. We interpret this change through the lens of institutional logics: 
the emergence of a ‘responsible investment logic’, coexisting and to some extent 
rivalling the long-standing ‘finance logic’ in mainstream institutional investment. The 
emergent responsible investment logic involves the development of separate but 
parallel processes such as one-on-one meetings between SRI managers and CSR 
managers on ESG issues, as well as the emergence of separate SRI analyst branches 
of the institutional investment industry. We trace this development looking at key 
events and factors which have contributed to the development of this responsible 
investment logic. 
 
There is a long history of ‘ethical investment’ which differs substantially from current 
responsible investment practice. Ethical investment has been followed for decades (if 
not centuries) by investors wishing to invest money according to strict ethical 
principles and involved the management of relatively small, dedicated portfolios and 
funds which screen out companies according to ethical/green criteria.
9
 The history and 
performance of purely ethical funds have been well-documented and is not the subject 
of this paper: we are interested in the evolution of responsible investment which 
employs a best in sector strategy and has infiltrated mainstream investment 
                                                 
8
 Terms such as: ethical investment, socially responsible investment, responsible investment, ‘social, 
ethical and environmental’ (SEE), ‘environmental, social and governance’ (ESG), enhanced analytics, 
enlightened shareholder value, etc. 
9
 The Sullivan Principles were established in the 1800s. Similarly the activities of the Quakers 
encouraged responsible business practices from the 17
th
 century in the UK. 
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portfolios.
10
 Therefore our analysis (and Table 1) refer to the emergence of 
responsible investment in the UK which we gauge from around 1990. 
 
Since around the turn of the century there has been a distinct shift away from 
screening strategies and towards direct engagement. For example, Friends, Ivory & 
Sime around 2000 implemented an engagement approach for social, ethical and 
environmental (SEE) issues, encouraging companies to listen to their institutional 
fund managers and make recommended changes to corporate strategy (Litvack, 2002). 
Another large institutional investor, Morley Fund Management, launched an SRI 
engagement programme intended to monitor investee companies' SEE behaviour 
around the turn of the century (Pensions Week, 2002). At a similar point in time, 
many UK pension funds started to advise their fund managers to adopt an SRI 
strategy of active engagement. For example, the trustees of the Church of Scotland 
pension fund were instructed to review the financial implications of the church 
pension fund's SRI policy and consequently decided to move away from a screening 
strategy and towards a strategy of engagement with investee companies on SRI issues, 
as there were fears that screening reduces investment return (Boatright, 1999; 
Wadsworth, 2002). 
 
Greater engagement and dialogue between institutional investors and their investee 
companies have been promoted since the Cadbury Report (1992) highlighted the need 
for the institutional investment community to accept responsibility for corporate 
governance and discharge accountability to their clients through more active share 
ownership. The recent Stewardship Code, despite its lack of regulatory backing, 
provides a solid architecture for the development of more effective engagement and 
dialogue with a focus on accountability and transparency by institutional 
shareholders. Further, the Stewardship Code explicitly advises institutional investors 
to escalate their activism in relation to ESG issues where problems arise within their 
investee companies. The process of private meetings between companies and their 
institutional investors represents a core element of engagement and dialogue and an 
important aspect of institutional investor stewardship. Private SER constitutes a 
significant part of responsible investment. Historically, responsible investment has 
been called ethical investment, SRI and consideration of ESG issues. Responsible 
investment is currently the commonly used term as it is perhaps deemed to have less 
negative connotations and may be more acceptable to the wider financial and 
corporate community. Responsible investment is a strategy now adopted by 
mainstream institutional investors which involves taking ESG considerations into 
account in the investment decision-making process.  
 
One of the actors instrumental in the process of integration is the United Nations 
Principles of Responsible Investment (UNPRI). UNPRI has produced six principles to 
guide responsible investment. UNPRI currently has just over one thousand signatories 
representing a total of $30 trillion dollars of investment which equates to 25% of 
global assets (Piani 2011). On average, institutional investors who have signed up to 
the UNPRI are commonly involved in four campaigns at any point in time, as UNPRI 
represents a forum for collective action and collaboration between institutional 
investors. The 2011 Report on Progress (PRI, 2011) found that 94% of asset owners 
                                                 
10
 See, for example, Gregory et al. (1997); Hancock (1999); Harte et al. (1991); Holden-Meehan 
(1999); Knowles (1997); Luther and Matatko (1994); Luther et al. (1992); Mallin et al. (1995); 
Williams (1999). 
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and 93% of investment managers have a responsible investment policy.
11
 Piani 
describes UNPRI Clearinghouse as representing a hybrid disclosure process, not 
public and not private. This hybrid form of social and environmental activism and 
reporting (Gond and Piani, 2011) is connected to private SER but is not synonymous 
with it. The collaboration is likely to influence the way in which institutional investors 
communicate with their investees in private meetings and probably informs the 
private reporting process to some extent. Overall, the work of UNPRI seems, at least 
on the surface, a significant move towards integrating ESG issues into the heart of 
institutional investment and institutional investors’ engagement and dialogue with 
investee companies. 
 
One of the interesting aspects of the development of the PRI and of the responsible 
investment agenda more broadly is the role of social activists. Indeed, the institutional 
literature recognises the role of entrepreneurs in instigating new institutional logics 
and organisational change (Lounsbury, 2001). The founder of the PRI, James Gifford 
came from an activist background and has been at the forefront of the evolution of a 
responsible investment logic. Lounsbury (2001) showed how, “...spin-off groups from 
the ecological movement helped to create a recycling industry and played a key role 
in the diffusion of recycling programs across US colleges and universities” 
(Lounsbury, 2008, p.355). A similar phenomenon is evident in SRI. Indeed, research 
has shown that social movements can have a substantial impact on the development of 
new industries as well as institutional change (Lounsbury, Ventresca and Hirsch, 
2003).
12
 The Student Environmental Action Coalition in the US was central to driving 
forward recycling programmes in schools. However, there has been relatively little 
research into the integration of social activists’ agendas into mainstream organisations 
(Giugni, 1998; Giugni, McAdam and Tilly, 1999; Lounsbury, 2001). The role of 
social activists in the evolution of responsible investment has not been researched but 
is evident in discussions with members of the SRI community.
13
 
 
A significant feature of responsible investment is the relatively recent evolution of 
private SER processes. There is a stream of literature which has investigated the 
evolution of these processes of one-on-one engagement. The majority of academic 
research into private reporting channels has focused on private financial reporting 
(Holland, 1998a; 1998b; Holland and Doran, 1998; Holland and Stoner, 1996; 
Roberts et al., 2006; Solomon and Solomon, 1999). There is a relatively small but 
expanding body of research into private SER. Friedman and Miles (2001) identified 
the beginning of a change in attitude within the City of London towards SRI. 
Solomon (2009) sketched the transformation of SRI from a marginal to a mainstream 
                                                 
11
 Not this refers to asset owners and investment managers who are signatories to UNPRI. In 2011 the 
survey covered 539 respondents managing assets of US$ 29.6 trillion. 
12
 Lounsbury et al. (2003) found that early social-movement-inspired non-profit recyclers’s efforts 
were ignored but that their activities led to the emergence of the modern recycling industry as, “… they 
provided a foundation for the successful creation of a new recycling industry since for-profit solid 
waste conglomerates could rely on the free labour of citizens who continued to clean and sort discards 
in the spirit of ecological goodwill” (p.96). Further this change led to a new ‘for-profit’ model. 
Similarities can be recognised between the influence of social activists on the growth of recycling and 
of social/environmental activists on the growth of responsible investment. 
13
 One of the authors has had many informal meetings and discussions with leading members of the 
SRI community over the last 15 years and the inspirational and crucial role of certain individuals in 
driving forward the development of responsible investment is a ‘taken-for-granted’ known within the 
this community. 
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issue within institutional investment. Solomon, Solomon and Norton (2002) provided 
evidence from a questionnaire survey to show that SRI was being driven by factors 
internal and external to investment institutions, including an increasing societal 
interest in social responsibility as well as the activities of special interest groups. Such 
shifts may be due to a shift in societal expectations (Laughlin, 1987; 1991), “[c]hange 
will take place as organisations react to broader changes that impact on the 
institutional environment in which they exist” (Broadbent et al., 2001, p.571). 
Solomon and Darby (2005) suggested that private SER represented a process whereby 
institutional investors and their investee companies were collaborating to create a 
joint green myth of social and environmental accountability. Such a myth is consistent 
with institutional change which is cosmetic rather than genuine. Solomon and 
Solomon (2006) showed from interviews with UK institutional investors that the 
private SER process was beginning to become more formalised and structured and 
demonstrated an interplay between private and public SER. Solomon, Solomon, 
Norton and Joseph (2011) demonstrated an increasing incidence of climate change 
within the private SER and the way in which climate change is starting to dominate 
the agenda with respect to other ESG issues. Indeed, climate change represents an 
increasingly crucial influencing external factor which represents a shock to the 
institutional investment community. Exogenous shocks which affect society are 
identified in the literature as factors which can drive institutional change and the 
emergence of new institutional logics. 
 
We present the emergence of the responsible investment logic by identifying the main 
factors and events driving its evolution. There are a host of other mechanisms within 
the responsible investment process which involve engagement and dialogue on social 
and environmental issues including investor roadshows, voting and web-based 
disclosures/blogs and other forms of dialogue with investors and other stakeholders. 
However there is a growing body of academic literature devoted to the face to face 
verbal communication between companies and their institutional investors on social 
and environmental issues and shaping this new rival logic within the institutional 
investment industry in tabular form. Table 1
14
 documents the emergence of a 
responsible investment logic by marking significant events that have encouraged and 
led to greater engagement by the UK institutional investment community with 
investee companies on ESG issues. The emergence of responsible investment 
practices, especially private SER as a form of responsible investment practice 
represents an emerging logic in institutional investment which has grown in a similar 
way to the emergence of the performance logic and it threat to the incumbent trustee 
logic in the mutual fund industry (Lounsbury, 2007). The emergence of the 
responsible investment logic has led to private SER practices/processes carrying on 
not in different organisations within the investment industry (as with the existence of 
different mutual funds) but in parallel with finance-dominated practice in the form of 
private financial reporting practices. However, the growth of responsible investment 
has also witnessed a degree of heterogeneity with some institutional investors 
focusing more heavily on the responsible investment logic and others not e.g. Hermes, 
Friends Provident, Hendersons as champions of SRI. “Multiple logics can create 
diversity in practice by enabling variety in cognitive orientation and contestation over 
which practices are appropriate. As a result, such multiplicity can create enormous 
                                                 
14
 Dunn and Jones (2010, p.117) expressed the development of logics of care and science in medical 
education in tabular form. We use a similar approach to document the emergence of a responsible 
investment logic in UK institutional investment. 
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ambiguity, leading to logic blending, the creation of new logics and the continued 
emergence of new practice variants” (Lounsbury, 2008, p.354).  
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
It seems from the existing literature as well as from practitioner studies that there has 
been a gradual transformation in the attitudes of the UK institutional investment 
community towards ESG issues and that since the turn of the century increasing 
attention has been given to these issues within the private reporting context. However, 
it has remained uncertain whether this transformation has resulted in the genuine 
integration of ESG issues into private financial reporting and therefore the 
mainstream investment decision-making process. In other words, private SER may 
continue to stand separately from private financial reporting, with different actors 
involved in each set of meetings and little or no joined-up thinking linking the two. 
Previous research has shown that private SER processes have been growing but 
suggest that the meetings have been running separately from the mainstream private 
financial reporting process. In this paper, we analyse the views of the corporate and 
institutional investor communities towards the private SER process and seek to 
discover the extent to which private SER is remaining separate or integrating with 
private financial reporting. We aim to discover whether private reporting is starting to 
mirror current trends in public reporting by adopting an integrated approach. 
 
 
3. Research method 
 
We conducted 39 interviews with representatives
15
 from companies listed among the 
FTSE100 and from leading UK investment institutions during 2007 and 2008. In the 
analysis we have coded the interviewees as C1-19, to refer to the company 
interviewees and I1-20 to refer to the institutional investor interviewees. We asked the 
interviewees a series of questions about their views and experiences of the evolution 
of the private SER process, directing specific questions to their perceptions of the 
future of private SER. The interviews were semi-structured and we encouraged 
interviewees to talk freely and at length in a self-reflective manner. We analysed the 
interview data interpretively allowing the framework to evolve out of the 
interviewees’ discussions. This interpretive, interview approach to research in finance 
and especially investigation into private reporting processes has grown in popularity 
in recent years in the academic accounting and finance literature.
16
 The interview 
method is also inkeeping with earlier studies of the evolution of institutional logics. 
The empirical application of institutional logics has implemented interviews as a 
research tool. For example, Thornton (1999) combined interview data with historical 
analysis to assess how institutional logics changed from an editorial to a market focus 
within the Higher Education publishing industry. We use the interview data to 
examine how the situation described in Table 1 is evolving further. We also analyse 
                                                 
15
 These were all CSR/IR (investor relations) managers and SRI managers who were directly involved 
in private SER. 
16
 See, for example, Holland (1998a; 1998b), Holland and Doran (1998), Holland and Stoner (1996),  
Roberts et al. (2006), Solomon and Darby (2005), Solomon and Solomon (2006), Solomon et al. (2011), 
Solomon et al. (forthcoming). 
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the data in order to provide a picture of any shift in institutional investment focus 
from purely financial to a holistic approach where financial and non-financial factors 
are combined. Similarly, Green et al. (2008) used interviews with corporate board 
members to examine how competing institutional logics shape institutional fields. 
Further, we only have interview data from listed companies and it would be 
informative to ask similar questions of the institutional investment community. There 
are naturally limitations to the use of interview method as the companies’ and 
investors’ public faces within the interview situation may differ from their private 
face. Although publicly our interviewees may discuss environmental issues, they may 
not place the same emphasis on these issues within the context of private SER. The 
focus of the research is on the UK context as this paper represents the culmination of 
about 15 years’ research by the authors into the evolution of responsible investment in 
the UK. 
 
4. Interview findings 
 
Our interviewees provided evidence to support the emergence of a responsible 
investment logic through the development of private SER. Further, the interviews 
provided evidence that private SER is gradually merging with private financial 
reporting. This development seems, from the perceptions of our interviewees and in 
our interpretation, to represent an increasingly integrated approach to private 
reporting. The findings are discussed in the following sections: the evolution of a 
responsible investment logic and private SER (supporting Table 1); merging of 
private SER with private financial reporting: evidence of a new institutional logic; 
evidence of resistance to private SER and to the responsible investment logic; 
perceptions concerning the future of private SER and evidence for the emergence of 
integrated private reporting. 
 
(i) Evolution of private SER and evidence of the responsible investment logic 
 
Our discussions with the company and investor interviewees indicated that there were 
a range of features characterising the emergence of a responsible investment logic and 
specifically the development of private SER including: the timing of the emergence of 
private SER; private SER becoming more proactive, more frequent and more mature; 
the growing perception that social and environmental issues are increasingly 
perceived as financial issues; increasing frequency of private SER. The investors we 
interviewed provided a strong business case for responsible investment which 
demonstrated a best in sector strategy and not a screening strategy, consistent with the 
development of responsible investment rather than earlier forms of ethical investment, 
 
“we don’t do any screening, no negative or positive screening; we really 
are just high conviction long term investors … the idea is to pick 
companies that are good for the planet, good for society, good for health, 
whatever the issue may be and that ultimately if they’re great companies 
then they will make even better returns for our clients” (I1). 
 
Our interviewees indicated a significant change in private SER over a short period of 
time and pinpointed the shift in attitude towards private SER within the institutional 
investment community as around the turn of the century, 
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“Well it’s changed quite considerably really because if I go back 7 or 8 
years, the institutional investors would not want to talk to [company] 
about anything to do with social or environmental issues at all and we 
would regularly publish environmental reports at the end of the year for 
all our operations and they would not want to receive anything, as simple 
as that” (C1, emphasis added). 
 
Both the company and the investor interviewees were specific about the ways in 
which private SER had evolved in recent years and explained how the sophistication 
and proactive nature of private SER had evolved, 
 
“... initially we were asked a large number of questions over a wide range 
of subjects and we were very reactive; Where they do engage us we’re 
extremely responsive so we go out of our way to get back to them and to 
give them the information they want, barring stuff that’s commercially 
confidential.  So I think that we’ve moved from being very reactive to 
being more proactive and we’re in a better place... … I felt at some stages 
there was an overreaction and over expectation on the part of… their 
expectations of the company were unrealistic.  I think now the 
expectations are much more realistic, they’re much more understanding 
of the constraints we’re working with and much more supportive of us 
working within those constraints” (C6, emphasis added). 
 
“In a nutshell it’s [private SER] now much more proactive, much more 
positive and much more routine.  I think 10 years ago if you went into a 
meeting with business and asked them about the environment or this or 
that, there was, for some companies, a degree of reticence in getting into 
that kind of discussion.  Now it’s routine business as usual, so actually the 
challenge now is not so much asking the basic questions, is actually 
having the probing questions and knowing the relevant and appropriate 
questions to ask….  the dialogue is much more informed. We’ve got 
obviously much beyond – have you got a policy, to actually – what does 
that mean for you as a business and where is it building your business 
reputation, what are the risks, how are you managing them.  So it’s now a 
much more informed debate than it was I think 10 years ago” (I10, 
emphasis added). 
 
There was a feeling among the company interviewees that the level of 
questioning in private SER had matured, the number of topics covered had 
lessened and the dialogue had become more focused, 
 
“2 years ago it [private SER] was a massive shopping list (all laugh) that 
never once did we manage to cover all of the issues, but ... in general, 
they’ve become more focussed conversations, hard to say how many 
topics but it’s probably no more than half a dozen maximum.  Sometimes 
it may be just one or two issues or one issue may dominate the meeting 
and then it’ll just be a couple of quick questions on other topics” (C7, 
emphasis added). 
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Our interviewees appeared to pinpoint the most significant change to one/two years 
before the interviews, i.e. about 2006/2007. This seems to represent a watershed in the 
extent and nature of private SER. Indeed, the interviewees perceived there was a 
growing acceptance among companies and investors that social and environmental 
issues are in fact financial issues and are material.
17
 Indeed, they suggested that social 
and environmental issues are no longer perceived as ‘non-financial’ issues but as 
financial in nature. This is a sea change in perceptions relating to issues which were 
traditionally deemed ‘soft’ or ‘qualitative, 
 
“climate change for business isn’t an environmental issue; it’s a financial 
issue” (C1, emphasis added). 
 
"I think too that people are really understanding that [environmental risk] 
is a material risk for investors, that this isn't some ‘willy nilly’, ‘pie in the 
sky’ thing … they’re [environmental issues] becoming more material… 
because oil is approaching record highs, because we have a cap and trade 
system in Europe … because the polar ice cap is melting and it's literally 
material now" (I1, emphasis added). 
 
The interviewees’ comments suggest that the recently emerged, but hitherto separate, 
responsible investment logic is starting to don the appearance and terminology of the 
dominant finance logic in institutional investment. Indeed, the emerging responsible 
investment logic is enshrined in the business case. Materiality of social and 
environmental issues appeared important from a risk perspective as the interviewees 
discussed the financial effect of social and environmental issues on company value in 
terms of the downside rather than the upside,  
 
“I think very few companies are actually given credit for doing anything 
particularly positive but they will suffer the consequences of doing 
something wrong” (C15, emphasis added). 
 
Our interviewees considered that social and environmental issues were material to 
their businesses, with one company estimating materiality thresholds at £50m (C1, 
C3) and another at £10m (C2),  
  
“... well they’re [social and environmental issues] hugely material, they 
are hugely significant.” (C3, emphasis added). 
 
“....If you’re dealing with a company where actually you’ve got industrial 
process of a significant type then you’ve got to conform to environmental 
legislation. Your risks of not conforming to that legislation are really 
significant to the extent of people losing licence to actually operate.  So 
yes they are very material” (C15, emphasis added). 
 
Interestingly, a legitimacy theory explanation for environmental risk management is 
prevalent here, as companies are clearly concerned about their license to operate as 
well as financial penalties attached to losing this license. The view that social and 
                                                 
17
 Only one outlier (C13) felt that social and environmental considerations were not material. 
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environmental issues constitute a financial risk was prevalent throughout the 
interviews,  
 
“I think what has changed is the way that investors have started to frame 
those issues in relation to investment decisions.  So it’s no longer just the 
case of, ‘are you complying with environmental legislation?’, it’s more, 
‘how are you going to take advantage of the low carbon economy and the 
opportunity that presents to sell products?’. So it’s a huge switch in 
thinking, so there’s on one hand a risk to be controlled, on the other its 
very much, how are you going to maximise this opportunity” (C2, 
emphasis added). 
 
Again the perceptions of the corporate as well as the investment community 
seem to have shifted such that social and environmental issues are now 
acknowledged as being material. 
 
“I’ve spent a couple of hours with [investment institution] about a month 
or so ago and they are starting to look at SRI far more seriously and they 
are plotting a lot of businesses and we’re included in that” (C3). 
 
These comments support the notion of an emerging responsible investment logic but 
one which is deeply rooted in the business case, materiality and financial risk/risk 
management. Indeed, the evidence from the interviews supports the emergence of a 
responsible investment logic as suggested in Table 1 and provides an image of the 
ways in which private SER has developed as a primary mechanism of responsible 
investment, a unique characteristic of UK institutional investment. 
 
One driving force behind the increasing integration of private SER into mainstream 
institutional investment identified by the interviewees was the growing importance of 
climate change to both companies and their core institutional investors, 
 
“…so we often get – can we come and meet just to talk about climate 
change, we want to understand your point of view” (C7). 
 
“climate change is a genie out of the bottle and it’s such a global issue its 
effects are enormous” (C8, emphasis added). 
 
“I’ve seen the emphasis on the areas of climate change and global 
warming has significantly increased in the last 3 to 4 years, it’s come 
almost to the head of the list of issues that they’re dealing with” (C11, 
emphasis added). 
 
Solomon et al. (2011) showed that institutional investors were focusing on the 
financial risks and opportunities related to climate change in their investee dialogue. 
From the perspective of the extant neoinstitutional literature, climate change may be 
perceived as a jolt or significant exogenous change which has caused a shift in 
institutional logic within the institutional investment community, “Institutional 
systems undergo change for both external and internal reasons. Exogenous change 
may be occasioned by disruptions occurring in wider or neighboring systems … that 
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destabilize existing rules and understandings” (Scott, 2008, p.437). The growth of 
private SER has clearly been spurred on by increasing concerns about climate change, 
 
“I think it [private SER] will grow, dialogue on these sorts of issues, 
particularly as environmental social problems become a bit more of a 
mainstream issue, just because they become more of a societal issue”  
(I13). 
 
Investors discussed changes in society’s attitudes towards social and environmental 
issues as a result of increased awareness of potentially catastrophic problems such as 
global warming. Such changes may be interpreted as shifts in societal attitudes and 
both companies and investors are struggling to adapt to these changes within their 
institutional settings. Such shifts in societal expectations can drive shifts in 
institutional logics. 
 
(ii) Emerging integrated private reporting 
 
Our interviewees provided evidence of a merging of the private SER process with 
private financial reporting also the involvement of mainstream fund managers and 
senior corporate directors in private SER meetings. Such merging of these two 
hitherto separate forms of private reporting indicates, in our view, the emergence of 
integrated private reporting. When asked to what extent they felt that material social 
and environmental issues were being integrated into mainstream financial one-on-one 
meetings, one company representative said,  
 
“There are mainstream investors and mainstream investor representatives 
who are starting to ask questions” (C12). 
 
The investors we interviewed were keen to integrate private SER into private financial 
one-on-one meetings: 
 
“Yes to date most of mine [meetings] are purely devoted to social and 
environmental issues but going forward, we’re trying to get the 
mainstream analysts and fund managers involved in it.  They have one-
on-one meetings all the time on financial issues so the idea is that maybe 
we might get one or 2 questions at the end on social and environmental 
issues” (I2) 
 
The interviewees indicated that social and environmental considerations are 
increasingly discussed in ‘mainstream’ meetings (i.e. private financial reporting) and 
questions on social and environmental issues are being increasingly asked by 
mainstream fund managers, 
 
“A lot of fund managers now incorporate elements of it [social and 
environmental issues] as part of their discussions with you. However, 
often you meet only with SRI specialists at that fund as well as at a 
separate meeting. So I can think of a couple of institutions that we’ve met 
recently where we initially had a meeting with a [mainstream] fund 
manager who incorporated small elements of SRI in the discussion but 
then a couple of weeks later the company also met the SRI specialist so 
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that all elements of it were covered for that fund as a whole” (C16, 
emphasis added). 
 
We interpret these changes and pressures for change as a shifting of institutional 
logic, as separate private SER is continuing but the dividing line between it and 
‘mainstream’ private financial reporting is starting to blur, as social and 
environmental issues are increasingly discussed within the context of private financial 
reporting. The emerging rival logic is becoming integrated into the dominant logic. It 
is as if private SER is slowly being subsumed into private financial reporting, 
 
“I think in the past it’s [quantity of social and environmental issues into  
mainstream institutional investment] probably been quite limited but now 
... that relationship is definitely growing and I think certainly for some 
funds, fund managers can’t make decisions about investing in a company 
without approval from the SRI team to say that, yes this meets their 
criteria around whatever their SRI agenda might be as well.” (C16, 
emphasis added). 
 
When asked specifically whether social and environmental issues were present on the 
agenda of mainstream financial one-on-one meetings, interviewees indicated that they 
were and that this was a very recent development, 
 
“The answer is yes and no, but two years ago, no it wouldn’t have been” 
(C1) 
 
“… as regards climate change, it will be quite a significant proportion of 
the [mainstream private financial reporting] agenda now….. when we’re 
thinking of how we explain a new investment, more so now than it ever 
has been, we will be looking at the social and environmental aspects that 
go alongside that, that will give a broader picture of what we’re trying to 
do” (C1, emphasis added). 
 
The interviewees explained that in meetings with the mainstream fund managers 
social and environmental issues are discussed, 
 
“..... probably up to about a year ago it would have only been the SRI 
person or the person that was interested in governance. That changed at 
the start of this year [i.e. 2008] and now the big [mainstream] fund 
managers are asking questions about climate change. Now it’s interesting 
to know where they’re getting their intelligence from; it’s almost certainly 
from the SRI fund manager providing it internally and then coming back 
down through the mainstream route” (C1, emphasis added). 
 
This provides an interesting insight into the workings of the information process, or at 
least the companies’ perceptions of this process. It is notable that the word ‘big’ is 
used to refer to what are ‘mainstream’ fund managers, as if SRI managers are 
considered ‘small’. This suggests that companies may take the ‘smaller’ SRI 
managers less seriously than the ‘big’ ones. Consequently it is likely that if the 
mainstream fund managers are starting to ask questions about ESG issues then 
companies will take more notice. Again, speaking of the integration of social and 
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environmental issues into private financial reporting there was a distinct increase in 
especially climate change information discussed in this previously exclusively 
‘financial’ context, 
 
“….I think there is no doubt that environmental issues, the impact of 
climate change and so on, now feature in discussions in a way that 
perhaps, 5 or 6 years ago they didn’t” (C5) 
 
Investors discussed the increasing integration of social and environmental issues into 
financial meetings and also into financial portfolio management models 
 
“I think the biggest evolution that we’ve seen at [investment institution] is 
we’re now very much more focussed on very company specific integrated 
engagements with our portfolio managers around how these issues impact 
strategy and where the company’s going with meetings at senior board 
level that feed directly into investment decisions. Can all these issues be 
quantified all the time?  No, but they do feed into the mental models that 
our portfolio managers have of companies, so that’s still integration. So 
our evolution has been very much more on making sure these things are 
integrated” (I3, emphasis added). 
 
Indeed, the investors provided substantial evidence of increasing integration of social 
and environmental considerations into the mainstream investment process, 
 
“My role is looking for the SEE [social, ethical and environmental] factors 
that are important and are impacting both balance sheets, to make sure the 
analyst knows about these and then they themselves can look at them and 
assess them on company specifics. You can call it mainstreaming if you 
like but it’s more just integrating what used to be 2 separate things – 
they’re not anymore because they are real and they are causing 
opportunities and they’re causing risks that need to be managed and it’s 
just part of assessing a company now and analysing a company” (I6, 
emphasis added). 
 
The increasing appearance of mainstream fund managers in private SER also 
indicated progressive integration of private SER into mainstream institutional 
investment, 
 
“… we’ll be meeting with the SRI people but they will bring the fund 
managers in sometimes. So not always but quite often they will bring the 
fund manager into the meeting” (C6, emphasis added). 
 
The interviews with the investors provided insights into why they sometimes included 
mainstream fund managers in private SER, 
 
“We also have the equity analyst and fund manager involved when it’s an 
important meeting” (I15). 
 
As well as ESG issues being integrated increasingly into private financial reporting, 
there is an increasing incidence of senior directors attending private SER, rather than 
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just the CSR managers as has been the case previously. A greater focus on corporate 
strategy also indicated a progressive integration of private SER into the mainstream 
consideration of corporate performance, 
 
“What I think has changed is increasingly those sessions [private SER] 
have now become truly face to face, true question and answer sessions, 
our senior team devoting time to sit with them” (C18, emphasis added). 
 
“the quality of response typically that we get from management of 
companies and the board of companies has improved significantly.  We 
find typically the Chief Executives and Chairs and senior independent 
Non Executive Directors are better placed to answer our questions in a 
way that they would have deferred before to their CSR manager, if they 
existed” (I16, emphasis added).   
 
The companies we interviewed described a more continuous dialogue on social and 
environmental issues. The companies explained that they were more conversant with 
social and environmental issues and could talk about them more easily in private SER 
than before, 
 
“I think when we started off on this route looking at more of the social 
aspects and integrating them into the environmental stuff, we did quite a 
lot of preparation, we just don’t do that now because we’ve got a team 
who know this stuff inside out ...” (C1, emphasis added). 
 
Senior management and directors are now expected to be conversant with social and 
environmental issues and answer questions in investor meetings with investors which 
they were not before, 
 
“… corporate governance, health & safety, environment, these are all 
reached at board level; the board will also be considering those, there’ll be 
a lot of responsibility there so it’s really at the top level.  It’s certainly not 
a case where the CEO is unaware of CSR; he has to be aware and he is 
fully aware, so it’s top level down....  we do have some investors, some 
we’ve met recently, who will be very much focused on finance but they 
also ... will invest simply in companies that have a good corporate 
governance attitude or good social attitude or consider the environmental 
impact as well” (C10, emphasis added). 
 
“our CEO … sits on our board CSR committee anyway so he can handle 
lots of questions” (C12, emphasis added). 
 
(iii) Resistance to private SER and the responsible investment logic 
 
Although our interviewees identified a number of areas of resistance to private SER 
and to the apparent ongoing increase in engagement on social and environmental 
issues, the general trend appeared to be that resistance was diminishing across the 
board. The linking of ethics/responsibility with finance is likely to meet with 
resistance in a similar way to the predicted resistance to linking health and money in 
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health reform (Broadbent et al., 2001).
18
 It seems from our interviews that the analyst 
community were resistant to the integration of private SER into mainstream 
institutional investment. Integration of social and environmental information seemed 
to be coming through the analysts’ role although very slowly. Indeed, resistance to 
integration of social and environmental information into mainstream institutional 
investment seemed to arise principally from the financial analysts’ community. 
 
“my sense is that even in those 2 years, things have changed quite 
dramatically but it is in a more indirect, subtle way, we’re still not getting 
the mainstream analysts asking those direct questions of the executive 
team, but they are increasingly coming through me and certainly I’ve seen 
calls for more engagement and I guess a greater maturity in the type of 
question that’s being asked ..... So I’d say even in the past 2 years, I’ve 
sensed a growing maturity in what analysts are asking…but it’s very 
difficult for us, from a corporate point of view, what is driving that; 
whether that is indeed just that the SRI community is evolving as opposed 
to quite separate or indeed whether there’s this crossover with the 
mainstream and you’re getting greater integration; I’d like to think that’s 
what is causing it, but again it’s hard to see direct evidence of that; it’s 
mostly more indirect, conversations with the analysts, the brokers etc”. 
(C7, emphasis added) 
 
Similarly, our investor interviewees explained that financial analysts and fund 
managers had had no interest in ESG issues but that this was beginning to change, 
there is still an unwillingness among the analyst community to engage on ESG issues, 
 
“… if all analysts put equal value on that kind of thing [social and 
environmental problems within companies] then it could actually be a 
fundamental driver in the value of a stock - but they don’t yet, they’re all 
marginal but I hope that maybe that will change” (I5) 
 
Analysts present resistance as they are much slower to integrate issues than the buy-
side investors and fund managers. Is this a case of decoupling as the analysts are not 
taking social and environmental integration on board whereas actors more senior in 
the institutional investment and corporate communities are? Although fund managers 
and buy-side are increasingly asking questions in meetings about social and 
environmental concerns, analysts are not: 
 
“The questions [on social and environmental considerations] weren’t 
being asked by mainstream investors and to some extent they’re still not 
being asked, probably to a large extent they’re still not being asked by 
mainstream analysts” (C7, emphasis added). 
 
Furthermore the influence and involvement of analysts has lessened, 
 
“.... the sell side is a route to the institutions as well.  So there’s the direct 
dialogue with our key shareholders and then there’s the indirect through 
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 “Whilst any group might well resist any change that is imposed upon it, the linking of health and 
money is particularly emotive” (Broadbent et al., 2001, p.566). 
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the sell side ... in the last few years the importance of the sell side analysts 
as a channel has lessened; the large institutions have become more self-
sufficient on their fundamental research and perhaps have been a little 
more demanding in meeting with the companies than they used to be.  So 
less arms’ length through the analysts now than it was maybe 10 or 15 
years ago” (C17, emphasis added). 
 
Earlier reliance on analysts by institutional investors meant that ESG was not 
integrated because the analysts were not taking it seriously. They were acting as a 
wall of resistance to integration. As investors rely less on analysts and more on their 
own research there is more integration of social and environmental information? As 
analysts become less important they are less of an obstacle to integration. Institutional 
investors (buy side) becoming more self-reliant. Neoinstitutional theory discusses the 
potential for incumbent structures and people to provide resistance to new 
mechanisms of (for example) governance and accountability within the institutional 
environment, 
 
“… knowledgeable and experienced practitioners that inhabit many 
organizations will frequently attempt to resist the introduction of formal 
control practices by manipulating the application of such new practices, 
transforming them into means for advancing their respective interests…” 
(Fiss, 2008, p.396). 
 
Such resistance by incumbent parties imbued with the dominant long-standing finance 
logic is consistent with the neoinstitutional academic literature which identifies 
resistance to organisational change (Broadbent et al, 2001). Resistance was 
interpreted as an ‘uneasy truce’ between rival logics of science care in medical 
education (Dunn and Jones, 2010). Despite the apparent rival nature of responsible 
investment logic and finance logic, the business case approach whereby ESG issues 
are starting to be perceived as material financial issues implies that these logics may 
gradually be seen not as antagonistic but rather supplementary to each other.
19
 Indeed, 
as analysts begin to appreciate the business case underlying the consideration of ESG 
issues in investment decisions their resistance to incorporating these factors is 
diminishing. Responsible investment specialists talked liberally about the resistance 
they struggled with among the financial analysts and financial fund managers, 
 
“The real difficulty we have is proving to fund managers and hardened 
analysts that it makes any difference in terms of share price.  But we are a 
business where it’s core to what we do so it’s taken as read this is what we 
do” (I10). 
 
A chief reason why mainstream analysts discount ESG issues is because they tend to 
impact companies over the medium/long term whereas analysts’ time horizons are 
short-term, 
 
“And of course the City is very short term, it’s only looking quarter to 
quarter.  [FTSE100 company] is saying, ‘this is going to save us money in 
                                                 
19
 Dunn and Jones (2010), quoting Peabody (1927) alluded to a similar situation in medical education 
regarding the apparently competing logics of care and science. 
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2012 onwards, trust us; we’re doing this now because of the long term’.  
For me as a long term investor that’s fantastic; for hardened City analysts 
it’s uninteresting because they want to know what’s happening next 
quarter” (I10) 
 
The investors we interviewed felt they had a role in educating analysts so that they 
would come to appreciate and understand the relevance of ESG issues to 
‘mainstream’ financial investment management,  
 
“What we’re trying to do is get the fund managers and the analysts to 
have a basic, reasonable knowledge of these sorts of issues, or the risks in 
this area that companies might face. So if it’s mining they might need to 
know some of the problems in certain countries and what climate change 
might mean for a mining company, whether there are water shortages or 
more hazardous mining techniques, things like that.  So it’s trying to bring 
them on a little bit so when they meet the companies, if they feel it’s 
appropriate, they can ask the questions….. We’re not trying to convert 
them into anything; we’re just trying to better educate them so they’re 
better able to do their jobs safely.  As I say some are more responsive than 
others” (I19, emphasis added). 
 
Similarly,  
 
“Analysts [who] have purely focussed on fundamentals and may not have 
looked at this sort of thing – my role is to educate them a bit into why they 
need to be looking at these other bits and pieces as well, they might be 
important.  It’s tied into the question as well that we often get is would 
you ever divest from a company because of an SEE situation and our 
response to that is – not one thing – it’s the same with the fundamental 
analysis, you wouldn’t divest just because one financial ratio was out of 
alignment, you’d look at it” (I6, emphasis added) 
 
The way in which the now initiated institutional investor community is ‘educating’ 
the analyst community is inherent in a shift in institutional logics. The resistance 
appears to be breaking down gradually with analysts taking an increasing interest in 
ESG issues as they are increasingly ‘educated’ by SRI specialists, 
 
“I think that dialogue will become more formalised … and it is already 
with the sell side analysts arranging more meetings on these [ESG] 
issues” (I15). 
 
Indeed, some investors suggested that the analysts’ resistance had broken down 
to the extent that they no longer viewed ESG separately but rather as part of the 
financial considerations, 
 
“… increasingly they [ESG] are mainstream issues and for our own equity 
analysts, they don’t see them as something that they should consider in 
addition to the financials; they look at it as part of the, in terms of – is this 
company a sustainable company?  Is how it’s managing its risks on SEE 
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as effective as how it’s managing its liabilities or its debts or whatever 
else” (I15). 
 
As well as the analyst community, the companies themselves presented some 
resistance to private SER but again this resistance seemed to be diminishing. As with 
the analysts, neo institutional theory suggests that organisations will resist change and 
the growing private SER process represents a significant change in companies’ 
relations with their institutional investors. Resistance from the corporate side to 
private SER and further integration of private SER appeared to arise from companies’ 
fears about sharing forward looking information with their core investors. However, 
the interviewees suggested that these fears were diminishing over the past few years, 
 
“..... there’s always a risk about sharing future, forward looking statements 
with investors; there’s always a debate in business about safe harbour and 
the extent to which you cannot get legal prosecution or institutional 
investors dropping you as a shareholding.  But we’ve taken a bit more of a 
proactive view over the last 4 or 5 years that the more they understand 
what we’re doing, actually the more confidence they have” (C1, emphasis 
added). 
 
“For us there’s the potential disadvantage of sharing information, being 
open and transparent to the extent that they see more risk to investing than 
others who are less transparent and again it’s a very delicate balance to 
play....” (C7). 
 
Despite the evident cost in time and resources of private SER, the companies seemed 
to feel that these were outweighed by the benefits of the meetings and discussion, 
 
“... it [private SER] costs us money as an organisation because you have 
to employ people and they spend time doing it, but ... the cost for us of not 
doing it would be immense” (C6) 
 
It seems that integration has accelerated significantly as these pockets of resistance 
have started to weaken. 
 
(iv) Perceptions concerning the future of private SER: Increasingly integrated 
private reporting 
 
We asked our interviewees how they perceived engagement and dialogue on social 
and environmental issues would evolve in the future and in what ways. The 
interviewees believed that private SER would continue to increase and also continue 
to become more integrated into mainstream institutional investment, 
 
“I don’t think there’s any doubt this [private SER] will grow, as I said in 
terms of people’s interests as they take a more holistic view of a 
company’s performance” (C8, emphasis added). 
 
“I think [private SER] it will continue to increase; my personal view 
would be over the next few years, environment will continue to become a 
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bigger and bigger issue and we’ll get more questions about it (C10, 
emphasis added). 
 
The companies perceived climate change as the driving force behind the increasing 
integration of private SER into one-on-one meetings with mainstream institutional 
investors, 
 
“Speaking to my area specifically, climate change, I think it is going to 
become much more mainstream because I think the world is moving 
towards sort of a global carbon standard and the cost of carbon will factor 
in almost everything we do ... So I see that as just doing nothing but 
growing and becoming a bigger part of that dialogue in the future” (C11, 
emphasis added). 
 
“I think in the short term engagement and dialogue will increase, largely 
driven by the climate change agenda, largely driven by potential increases 
in legislation and how businesses will respond to them ... it’ll become 
much more embedded, much more mainstream” (C18, emphasis added). 
 
Interviewees also discussed a potentially paradoxical situation that as integration 
continues to increase private SER will actually diminish, as it becomes more part of 
the mainstream engagement and dialogue figured strongly in the discussions, 
 
“If the current trend of discussions on climate change continues, 
interestingly enough I think the SRI community will actually reduce 
because I think the mainstream managers will start to understand what 
some of these issues are about … we’ve worked terribly hard to embed it 
in our business to the extent that the vast majority of our board could 
probably talk quite eloquently on many of these issues .... So I think the 
engagement will decrease on social and environmental issues as specific 
[meetings] but they’ll come through the mainstream” (C1, emphasis 
added). 
 
“Well I’m making a fairly heavy bet that I’m right in that people will 
increasingly focus on this as a part of their normal mainstream 
investment.  Normal mainstream investment means pulling out the 5 
reasons to invest in a stock:  The material risks and opportunities; where 
they fit with a responsible investment theme; it should be discussed with 
the company and it should be, when the CEO comes in, one of the 
questions we ask them – if it’s not material it shouldn’t be discussed.  So 
yes I’d see it as moving more and more into part of the way my 
mainstream sector analyst talks to his broker and the way the broker 
speaks to IR and the way we speak to the company when they come in, 
rather than a separate SRI person speaking to the CSR team – much more 
involved in the mainstream” (I8, emphasis added). 
 
“I think that in 10 years’ time every investment is going to have to have 
some kind of ESG application and that’s going to come because of the 
UNPRI [United Nations Principles of Responsible Investment] and some 
legislation” (I18). 
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External change in climate will encourage institutional investors to align their 
activities with the expectations arising from societal expectations and ethos 
(Broadbent and Laughlin, 1991; Laughlin and Power, 1996).  
 
“It’s really important that my role is eventually phased out and the IR 
team are doing it as one joined-up story and they shouldn’t need to be 
experts in climate change or carbon capture and storage or these things” 
(C7). 
 
This feeling that the specialist roles in companies may disappear as ESG issues merge 
with financial issues was mirrored by the investor interviewees’ views, 
 
“I would like to hope that it just becomes, I suppose, my job, effectively 
null and void and that it becomes part of the mainstream. So I hope that it 
will become absolutely [integrated] and you’ll have a set of questions on 
key performance areas from a financial perspective and in every meeting 
you have questions on how they’re looking at environmental and social 
issues – that’s what I would hope and I don’t see any reason why that 
can’t be” (I5, emphasis added). 
 
From the investors’ point of view this increasing integration of ESG into the 
mainstream could also imply the capture of ESG issues (now deemed financial) by the 
mainstream financial analysts and fund managers who previously resisted the 
responsible investment logic, 
 
“I’d hope that even more issues would get mainstream and that the ESG 
dialogue won’t be special meetings but will be part of the general 
roadshow.  The interesting issue is whether we’ll still be allowed to do it 
because for example climate change used to be pretty much our preserve – 
now it’s gone so mainstream that some of the mainstream analysts are 
almost saying – it’s far too important for you guys, you little liberals to be 
faffing around!  (both laugh) Yeah, I hope it would get more mainstream” 
(I20) 
 
Such disappearance of separate private SER is suggestive of the integration and 
incorporation of the responsible logic of ESG into the dominant finance logic such 
that the finance logic of private financial reporting becomes inclusive of ESG issues 
and more holistic. This also reflects the shift in public sustainability reporting 
whereby the ultimate objective in its evolution appears to be the production of one 
integrated report which integrates material social and environmental issues into the 
mainstream report, making the production of separate sustainability reports 
unnecessary (IIRC, 2011). We present this optimistic outcome as scenario one in 
Figure 1. 
 
Alternately, the merging of private SER and private financial reporting could 
represent a simulacrum of a hybridisation of institutional logics whereby private SER 
is effectively absorbed into private financial reporting losing its potential to effect 
change. This less optimistic, more sceptical vision is represented as scenario two in 
Figure 1. Neoinstitutional theory has been somewhat preoccupied with the notion of 
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ceremonial or superficial conformity by organisations when faced with institutional 
pressures to change (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott, 2008). Decoupling can arise 
where organisations are forced to adopt structural changes but ‘decouple’ them from 
actual practices by constructing practices which simulate genuine change (see for 
example Archel et al.’s findings for stakeholder engagement). The evolution of 
private SER could be interpreted in this light, as the meetings have been seen as 
opportunities for ritual and myth creation and appear to have little effect on 
investment decision making (Solomon et al., forthcoming). Such decoupling may be 
interpreted as a response to pressure for institutional change. A linked response is for 
organisations to “‘internalise’ the threat, incorporating new types of actors expert in 
dealing with these issues. The evidence provided in this paper could suggest that 
integrating SRI managers into private financial reporting may be a way of absorbing 
and neutralising the ‘threat’ from the responsible investment community rather than 
genuinely integrating the issues into the heart of financial private reporting processes. 
Certainly, the evolution of private SER with the development of a separate process 
running parallel to private financial reporting with the emergence since the late 1990s 
of SRI managers and SRI analysts resonates with the findings of earlier work 
(Hoffman, 1997).
20
 The emergence of new roles and actors can enhance the strength 
of the emerging logic or weaken it (Scott, 2008). From our findings, we can see that 
these responses are occurring but on the basis of our data we cannot yet establish 
whether these changes will lead to scenario one or scenario two. 
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
5. Concluding discussion 
 
This paper provides substantial evidence that integrated private reporting is starting to 
emerge. Interviews with representatives from FTSE100 companies and from UK 
investment institutions confirmed that a responsible investment logic has evolved in a 
relatively short space of time, with private SER developing as an important 
mechanism of responsible investment. Further, our findings highlight what may be 
interpreted as a hybridisation of institutional logics within the institutional investment 
community. Instead of remaining a marginal and separate element of institutional 
investment, our findings show that private SER is merging with private financial 
reporting. This merging appears to represent the integration of responsible investment 
into mainstream institutional investment. We suggest that this trend represents the 
emergence of integrated private reporting, mirroring a similar trend in the public 
reporting sphere. Our interviewees were directly involved in private SER and talked 
about the long-term changes in attitude within the institutional investment community 
in the private SER process. They noted resistance to this process of institutional 
change in attitude and behaviour from within the institutional investment community, 
most notably among financial analysts as well as from the corporate community. 
However, as the role of analysts in institutional investment weakens and as the 
analysts themselves begin to accommodate hitherto ‘non-financial’ considerations 
into their remit, the level of resistance seems to be diminishing. Traditional attitudes 
which prioritise the financial and marginalise the ‘non-financial’ seem less and less 
relevant to contemporary financial markets. This is the first paper which suggests the 
                                                 
20
 Hoffman (1997) found that environmental specialists were hired in new offices/departments within 
chemical organisations in order to cope with the demands from environmental lobbyists (Scott, 2008). 
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emergence of integrated private reporting and thus makes a contribution to accounting 
theory as well as to the practice of private reporting. Further, a practical policy 
implication arising from the research could be the need for education of the financial 
analyst community in the materiality of ESG issues. 
 
This paper seeks to advance studies in institutional theory by demonstrating the 
emergence of a coexistent responsible investment logic embodied in private SER and 
running in tandem with established private financial reporting meetings (i.e. the 
dominant finance logic in investment). Institutional logics has hitherto not been used 
as a means of interpreting the growth of responsible investment and private SER. 
Therefore, we feel that this paper contributes to the theoretical field of institutional 
logics by extending the application of this theoretical framework into a new area. 
Further, as private SER merges increasingly with private financial reporting it is 
possible that there is a shift from a dominant finance logic to an increasingly 
hybridised institutional investment logic which is holistic in nature featuring 
integrated investment considering both financial and ESG issues together in 
mainstream institutional investment strategy and decision-making. What we see, 
similar to the findings of Dunn and Jones (2010), may not be the replacement of the 
finance logic with the responsible investment logic but rather a metamorphosis of the 
institutional investors’ perceptions from the dominant finance logic into a holistic 
logic within institutional investment and corporate governance. This emergence of a 
hybrid logic may also represent the coexistence of a logic of responsibility with the 
dominant finance logic is similar to findings for other institutional domains, for 
example, “…. plural logics co-evolve within a profession over time. We found that 
care and science logics coexist, moving through periods of balance and imbalance and 
residing in perhaps an uneasy tension that is not easily resolved in medical education” 
(Dunn and Jones, 2010, p.139). There are also similarities with the work of 
Lounsbury (2007) where the US mutual fund industry was found to have shifted from 
dominance by a trustee logic to a financial logic over time. Indeed we are seeing a 
reverse situation where the UK institutional investment industry is moving from a 
short-termist financial logic to a responsible logic with greater emphasis on the long-
term. Such merging of logics could signal the emergence of integrated private 
reporting mirroring trends to produce integrated reports in the public reporting arena. 
 
The apparent hybridisation of hitherto soft, qualitative factors with financial 
considerations may however be interpreted in a different manner. From an 
institutional theory perspective it is possible that a new, hybridised institutional 
investment logic may instead be simply the long-dominant finance logic dressed as 
something different. The growth of responsible investment (itself perhaps a 
euphemism to appease hardline investors) may be interpreted as the neutralisation of 
SRI and of any activist social and environmental agenda within the institutional 
investment community, originally aimed at transforming corporate behaviour. Taking 
a critical view, it is possible that the strategies of resistance to pressure from the 
responsible investment actors has been to redefine ESG in financial terms, to talk of 
materiality of social and environmental issues and to redefine terminology in order to 
apparently integrate RI into the mainstream. Such attempts by the mainstream 
institutional investment community may be interpreted as strategies of resistance to 
organisational change (Broadbent et al., 2001). The increasing involvement of senior 
directors and mainstream fund managers in the private SER engagement process may 
be more about absorption and neutralisation of the SRI agenda than about genuine 
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integration. From this perspective, we may be witnessing absorption (Broadbent et al., 
2001) of the responsible investment logic into the financial logic. This alternative and 
rather jaundiced view is nevertheless consistent with recent interpretations of 
stakeholder engagement processes as well as of the private social and environmental 
processes as ritual, myth creation and the institutionalisation of unaccountability 
(Archel et al, 2011; Solomon and Darby, 2005; Solomon et al., 2010). We feel that 
this alternative interpretation represents an extension of theoretical work in private 
reporting.  
 
There are also other issues at work within the institutional investment community 
which could be playing a part in the apparent hybridisation of logics. The investors 
are keen to grow and maintain their client base and clients are currently attracted to 
investment institutions which appear to be responsible in a climate of increasing 
environmental awareness and concern for human rights. Such moves by the 
institutional investment community are likely to be in line with current expectations 
and consensus of UK society at large. By ‘looking like’ responsible investors, the 
institutions may be seeking to align their attitudes and activities with those of society 
at large. There are also tax incentives for companies to become more socially 
responsible. Further research is necessary to assess the extent to which this evident 
integrative process falls into scenario one or two. Further research is now required to 
explore the nature of the increasing integration through the eyes of other agents within 
the institutional investment community involved in this private SER process, for 
example analysts. 
 
A possible explanation for this precipitous metamorphosis from financial logic to 
financial/responsible logic may be the growing societal awareness of climate change 
and of its substantial implications for the finance industry and financial institutions 
inter alia. Indeed, the rate of growth of the responsible investment agenda has 
increased intensely over the last ten years, as discussed throughout the paper. A ‘jolt’ 
as pervasive and global as climate change has perhaps accelerated the nascent 
institutional change within the investment industry and within the process of 
engagement and dialogue, “Environmental jolts highlight institutionalized 
assumptions about the environment, and reveal unexpected relationships between 
institutionalized practices, technologies, organizational forms, and outcomes that may 
not be apparent in times of stasis … Jolts can prompt field-wide crisis, that is, 
perceptions by field actors (organizations, regulators, investors, customers, etc.) that 
fundamental outcomes are in contrast to expectations, and precipitate action intended 
to avoid dramatic negative outcomes” (Sine and David, 2003, p.186). The growing 
recognition that traditional, purely financial indicators are no longer sufficient for 
investors to value and appraise corporate performance and success is manifesting 
itself in new and emergent forms of dialogue between investors and investees which 
could be holistic, integrated and inclusive. Despite the pessimistic view of 
institutional change presented in scenario two, the strength of the underlying social 
movement and its success in infiltrating mainstream institutional investment may 
imply that the merging of private SER and private financial reporting could result in 
genuine change over time. “… the embedding of social movement discourse and 
practice within conservative institutional frameworks holds out the possibility of 
continued social change, albeit in much less visible and dramatic ways” (Lounsbury, 
2001, p.52). 
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Instead of responding to the perceived ‘threat’ of a growing responsible investment 
logic, by developing a genuinely holistic approach to institutional investment, it may 
be that the absorption of responsible investment into mainstream institutional 
investment represents a strengthening of the financial logic. By assimilating 
responsible investment mechanisms such as private SER into mainstream financial 
meetings and financial investment decision-making. To echo Greenwood and 
Suddaby (2006) bringing social and environmental issues into private financial 
reporting and into the heart of mainstream investment processes, investment 
institutions may in fact be rejecting the status quo of how to do things but at the same 
time the logic of shareholder value may remain untouched, or even strengthened, 
reinforcing the status quo of ‘who’ benefits (i.e. shareholders). Positive impacts on 
other stakeholders are likely to be coincidental by-products rather than intended 
consequences. 
 
The way in which earlier forms of ethical investment have been overtaken by 
responsible investment which is embedded in the business case and in a shareholder 
value approach may be seen as an ‘amoralising’21 of traditional ethical investment and 
its roots in ethics and morality: responsible investment going forward may simply 
become financial investment with inclusion of ESG factors according purely to 
financial considerations. In this scenario, all ethical, philanthropic, social 
responsibility concerns are subordinated to financial considerations. This has certainly 
been supported by research into private meetings on climate change issues, as these 
were found to be dominated by a discourse of (financial-related) risk and opportunity. 
 
To summarise, the merging of private SER with private financial reporting bears 
striking similarity to current attempts to develop integrated reporting in the public 
disclosure domain.
22
 Indeed, it seems that private reporting channels may be 
following public reporting channels by attempting to integrate sustainability 
information into the heart of mainstream, traditionally financial reporting processes. 
Or it may be that private reporting channels are leading public reporting in this area, 
causality is hard to identify. As for sustainability reporting, the change in discourse 
(adopting more financial terms to disclose sustainability information) within 
sustainability reports over time may reflect attempts by corporates to neutralise the 
sustainability agenda rather than genuinely engage with it (Tregidga and Milne, 
2006). Similar shifts in discourse within the responsible investment environment, 
from a discourse of ethics (as pertaining to traditional ethical investment) to a 
discourse of risk, opportunity and shareholder value (the business case) may similarly 
be neutralising the original agenda for bringing greater responsibility into institutional 
investment via private SER. This neutralisation could, if not countered, signal the end 
of ethical and socially responsible investment. Further research is needed to assess the 
extent to which either of these scenarios are borne out by evidence. 
                                                 
21
 We thank Markus Milne for suggesting this interpretation of ‘amoralising’ when we presented the 
paper at the FRBC conference, July 2012. 
22
 See Solomon and Maroun (2012) for a summary of the current attempts to develop integrated reports 
internationally. 
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Table 1 
The Evolution of a Responsible Investment Logic in the UK 
 
Date Event Contribution to responsible investment logic 
1992 Cadbury Report published First policy document to stress the importance of institutional 
investor engagement with investee companies 
1997 Huntingdon Life Science UK institutional investors and later US investors pulled out of 
Huntingdon Life Science over animal rights abuses 
2000 GRI guidelines launched First guidelines for sustainability reporting launched. They are 
now in their fourth generation. 
2001 FTSE4Good series 
launched 
These UK SRI indices include companies which are rated as 
performing well across ESG criteria 
2001 Change to UK pension 
fund law 
Mandatory requirement for all institutional investors to disclose in 
the Statement of Investment Principles the extent to which, if at 
all, they consider social, ethical and environmental issues in their 
investment decision making 
2002 Institutional 
Shareholders’ Committee 
(ISC) Code published 
The Responsibilities of Institutional Shareholders and Agents: 
Statement of Principles established a benchmark for institutional 
investor practice in the areas of engagement and voting 
2001 Association of British 
Insurers’ (ABI) SEE 
reporting guidelines 
This set of guidelines indicated what SEE information institutional 
investors would like to see disclosed 
2000 Carbon Disclosure Project 
(CDP) launched 
This global institutional investors’ collaborative group asks 
companies to complete an annual survey on carbon emissions and 
related information. 
2005 Freshfields Bruckhaus 
Derringer Report 
published 
Specified the consideration of ESG issues to be part of a pension 
fund’s fiduciary duty where: (a) there was a consensus among 
pension fund members (b) where ESG issues were deemed 
material  
2006 Stern Review published Stern Review stated scientific consensus on global warming and 
had an immediate impact on society 
2006 Revision of UK Company 
Law 
Legal endorsement for companies to consider stakeholders in their 
decision making 
2006 UN endorsement of PRI Endorsement of the PRI Principles by the UN provided them with 
greater international profile 
2007 ABI revised guidelines Revised guidelines alter terminology from SEE to ESG disclosure 
2010 Stewardship Code 
published 
ISC code adopted by the FRC as a code aimed to enhance the 
quality of engagement between institutional investors and 
companies 
2010 BP crisis High profile oil spill in Gulf of Mexico highlighted financial 
nature of ESG risk 
2010 PRI Clearinghouse The establishment of the Clearinghouse Engagement Platform 
marks a distinct step towards greater collaborative activism among 
global institutional investors on ESG issues  
2011 FairPensions Report 
published 
Report specifies the need for pension funds to redefine fiduciary 
duty to incorporate broader issues such as ESG. 
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Figure 1 
Interpretation 1: Integrated Private Reporting 
 
20th century 
Long dominant finance 
logic in institutional 
investment 
Private financial 
reporting developing 
  
  2000 – 2007 
  Emergence of competing 
responsible investment logic 
Private SER developing as a 
separate process distinct from 
private financial reporting 
   
 2007/8  
 Holistic logic, ESG integrated into 
traditional finance logic indicating a 
paradigm shift as non-financial issues 
recognised as financial 
Integrated private reporting emerges  
 
   
 Future?  
 Institutional investment takes holistic 
approach fully integrating ESG issues and 
private SER disappears as a separate 
process 
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Figure 2 
Interpretation 2: Absorption of responsible investment logic by dominant 
finance logic? 
 
20th century 
Long dominant finance logic in institutional 
investment 
Private financial reporting developing 
  
  2000 – 2007 
  Emergence of competing institutional logic 
of responsible investment 
Private SER developing as a separate process 
distinct from private financial reporting 
   
2007/8   
Dominant finance logic absorbs responsible 
investment logic: not genuine integration 
Private financial reporting absorbs private SER  
  
   
Future?   
Private SER ceases to exist as a separate process: 
institutionalisation of unaccountability? 
Responsible investment neutralised 
  
 
 
 
